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I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE ARE an unusual number of fascinating issues that are
floating around the international aviation community today
and that seem to have no quick answers. One thinks, for exam-
ple, of whether the airline alliances of today have stimulated
competition or have been a bad substitute for the mergers that
might have occurred with or without the regulations that govern
the antiquated international rules of ownership and control?
* Allan I. Mendelsohn, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Transportation Affairs, chaired the U.S. delegation that led to the APEC
multilateral open skies agreement. Currently an Adjunct Professor of
International Transportation Law and Conflicts of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center, Mr. Mendelsohn practices law with the firm of Sher & Blackwell in
Washington, D.C. He also serves on the Advisory Board of this Journal.
- This article is intended to convey Mr. Mendelsohn's personal opinions and
observations.
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Alternatively, might a world with those rules but without alli-
ances have worked out better for U.S. carriers that today seem to
play less of an international role, and more of a trans-ocean
shuttle role, than was true before the alliance era? Is there or
should there be an exit strategy from the world of alliances, or is
that what the upcoming E.U.-U.S. negotiations are all about?
This article does not explore any of these mega questions. Its
purpose is the more limited one of simply debunking a number
of myths that seem to have taken root in the world of interna-
tional aviation over the past several years. These myths have be-
come especially voguish since the decision of the European
Court of Justice provided the European Commission with a lim-
ited mandate to negotiate aviation issues with the United States.'
This article focuses principally on the current thinking in the
international aviation community about such issues as U.S. cabo-
tage vs. European fifth freedom, whether multinational owner-
ship of airlines is indeed an achievable goal of negotiations in
today's aviation world, and how the world's aviation community
should best adjust to the concept of "Right of Establishment."
II. THE MYTH THAT U.S. FIFTH FREEDOM RIGHTS
BETWEEN E.U. MEMBER STATES IS THE FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENT OF CABOTAGE WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES
All of us have repeatedly heard European spokesmen and self-
styled globalists argue - no, it's more of a casual observation -
that, of course, if U.S. airlines are to continue to enjoy their fifth
freedom rights (currently in all U.S. bilaterals with E.U. Member
States) to operate between E.U. Member States, then E.U. Mem-
ber State airlines should enjoy the functional equivalent in the
U.S. of being able to operate cabotage services within the U.S.
To be precise, if as part of their services to or from the U.S., U.S.
airlines can pick up London origin passengers in London des-
tined for Rome, then as a matter of reciprocity, E.U. airlines, on
their services to and from the U.S., should be able to pick up,
for example, Boston origin passengers destined for Denver.
There are several flaws in this analysis - indeed, so many that it
is hard to decide where to begin. First, no one can ignore that
I See Cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-
475/98 and C-476/98, Commission v. United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Fin-
land, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany [Nov. 5, 2002] O.J. (C232/1),
available at http://europa.eu.int.
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the fifth freedom rights enjoyed by U.S. carriers between E.U.
points are rights that are incorporated and specifically provided
for in bilateral agreements. 2 To curtail these rights, therefore,
would require either denunciation of the bilaterals by the E.U.
Member States, or voluntary surrender of these rights by the
U.S. Government. Though not required by the ECJ decision,
the European Commission has repeatedly called for denuncia-
tion by the E.U. Member States.' Thus far, these requests have
been diplomatically ignored. Further, it is very doubtful
whether the U.S. would ever voluntarily forego these rights.
Second, no one should ignore that the fifth freedom rights
currently in all the bilaterals the U.S. has with E.U. Member
States did not appear because of any beneficence on the part of
E.U. Member States. Rather, they came out of the intensive bar-
gaining process that used to be so characteristic of bilateral ne-
gotiations before the days of open skies.4 When the U.S.
obtained the right from Italy to be able to carry U.K. originating
passengers to Rome, it was only because Italy insisted that, in
return, the U.S. give Italy the right for Alitalia to operate, for
example, to three new U.S. gateway points such as Washington,
D.C., San Francisco, and Los Angeles, in addition, of course, to
Boston and New York.5
Moreover, after the negotiation was concluded with Italy,
(often a two to three week process), the U.S. then had to negoti-
ate independently with the U.K. for the right to board those pas-
sengers in the U.K. destined for Rome. In return for this, the
2 The U.S.-German Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, for example, provides
that U.S. air carriers have the right to operate "from points behind the United
States via the United Sates and intermediate points to a point or points in Get-
many and beyond." Air Transport Agreement Between the United States of
American and the Federal Republic of Germany, July 7, 1955, U.S.-F.R.G., 7
U.S.T. 527. The terms "intermediate points" and "beyond" both encompass
points in other EU Member States.
3 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States, the European Union, and the Owner-
ship and Control of Airlines, ISSUES IN AVIATION LAW & POLICY 13171 (Gerald L.
Baliles ed.) (2003) (quoting pertinent portions of Letter from Francois
Lemoureux, EC Director Gereral for Transport to E.U. Member States (Jan. 29,
2003)).
4 See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and France Re-
specting Air Transport Services, Mar. 27, 1946, U.S.-Fr., 61 Stat. 3445, as
amended on Apr. 5, 1960, May 29, 1969, and May 6, 1985; U.S.-German Bilateral
Air Transport Agreement, as amended on Apr. 5, 1968, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Italian Republic, June 22, 1970,
and Sept. 27, 1990, U.S.-Italy, 21 U.S.T. 2096.
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U.K. demanded additional gateway points in the U.S. (for what
was then BOAC). Nor was it at all unusual for the U.S. to be
whipsawed between the two congenial European negotiating
teams.
Those who came to participate in the world of international
aviation only after the advent of "open skies" have no knowledge
of, let alone appreciation for, this history. There are not many
in the world of aviation today who were there in those "olden"-
some would say "golden"-days. But for those of us who were
there, the task was arduous for the U.S. Government, yet very
important for U.S. carriers with the short range aircraft of the
day. Today, of course, those fifth freedom rights are hardly ever
used by U.S. passenger carriers, which mostly rely on their code
share partners to provide services behind the first E.U. gateway
point. It is essential, however, for the international aviation
community to know this history, especially those who so glibly
equate fifth freedom within the E.U. to cabotage within the U.S.
Third, even if we decide to blithely ignore this history-be-
cause, some would say, it is based on old-time value analysis
rather than new-time opportunity analysis-there is still the im-
possible-to-ignore fact that the E.U. is not yet an institutionally
recognized federal entity. Despite the forward-looking third
package adopted in 1992,6 and the more recent admirable adop-
tion of the Euro, the E.U. is still very much a collection of sover-
eign, very nationally oriented States, each with individual
foreign policies, and each with individual votes in both the
United Nations and in the ICAO Council-where eight E.U. na-
tion-States now enjoy eight individual votes.
Can an entity of this type really deem itself to be like the
United States or as the equivalent of a cabotage zone vis-a-vis the
rest of the world? One may be willing to indefinitely tolerate
individual votes among the E.U. Member States in the United
Nations itself. However, one cannot rationally view the E.U. as a
cabotage zone for aviation purposes, while allowing the E.U. to
continue to cast its eight votes in the ICAO Council.
Until the Euro-federalists prevail and the E.U. opts to forego
its quintessentially nationalist approach to the ICAO, it is highly
doubtful that E.U. Member States can or should be internation-
ally viewed as a single state entity for purposes of air traffic cabo-
tage. This is not to say that the United States and others may
6 See Rene Fennes, The European Court ofJustice Decision on Bilateral Agreements -
the Future of Relations, 17 AIR & SPACE LAw 14, 14-19 (2003).
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not ultimately decide otherwise at some future point, perhaps
when the E.U. enjoys a single air traffic safety agency or a single
designating authority, or perhaps even sooner than that. Until
that times comes, however, any demand by the E.U. that fifth
freedom rights within the E.U. be equated to cabotage within
the U.S. will fall on deaf ears. In short, the parties are best ad-
vised to turn their attention to other issues, at least until the
E.U.'s groundwork for unification is far better embedded than it
is today.
III. THE MYTH THAT THE UNITED STATES IS THE
OBSTACLE TO CROSS-BORDER MERGERS OR
CONSOLIDATIONS AMONG E.U.
MEMBER STATE AIR CARRIERS
It seems to be almost conventional wisdom among European
commentators nowadays that it is the outmoded but selectively
enforced ownership and control ("O&C") policies of the United
States that explain the failure of E.U. Member State airlines to
merge or consolidate in any numbers to date, as well as the fail-
ure of the BA/KLM effort to consolidate in the fall of 2000.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
While the U.S. has not been able to amend the O&C clauses
that are present in all the bilaterals with E.U. Member States,
the U.S. Government, I believe, would welcome and put no
roadblocks, bilateral or otherwise, in the way of E.U. airline con-
solidations, at least among airlines of E.U. Member States with
which the U.S. maintains open skies agreements. For example, I
do not recall the U.S. standing in the way of the ill-fated Swissair
purchase of 49% of Sabena.7 Nor do I recall the U.S. objecting
to, or in any way thwarting, the multinationally-owned Cargo
Lion Airlines that was designated and effectively regulated by
Luxembourg though owned largely by German and Swiss na-
tionals (with no Luxembourg ownership interest at all).8
The U. S. Department of Transportation gave Cargo Lion a
foreign air carrier license in 1998,9 and in doing so, demon-
strated to what seems to have been a totally unobservant Euro-
7 Both Swissair and Sabena have since gone bankrupt and have disappeared
from the international aviation community. See AvIATION DAILY, Nov. 27, 2001, at
1.
8 See Translux International Airlines SA d/b/a CargoLion, DOT Docket 98-
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pean aviation community that the U.S. had no objection to
multinationally-owned foreign airlines, so long as they were in-
corporated in and effectively regulated (i.e., proper aviation
safety oversight) by states that were in the FAA's Category 1 and
that enjoyed open skies bilateral arrangements with the U.S.'
Nor did the U.S. have any serious negative impact on the
aborted BA/KLM merger effort. It is often convenient for Euro-
pean observers and others to fault the U.S. and to suggest that
the merger failed because KLM discovered that, in a merger, the
Netherlands would lose the benefits of its open skies agreement
with the U.S. That is not correct. I was in the U.S. Government
when that merger was undertaken, and I know that its failure
was not attributable to any official position taken or not taken by
the U.S. Government, but rather because, as was later openly
reported, these were simply incompatible merger partners.
KLM did not want to lose its independent identity and appar-
ently concluded that it would be shortchanged by BA in a
merger. "
The BA/KLM merger effort provides an excellent example of
how the U.S. can adjust its policy to accommodate mergers be-
tween or among airlines of E.U. Member States, one or more of
which do not have an open skies bilateral with the U.S. (such as
the U.K., Ireland, Greece and Spain). A little-noticed, but very
important example of U.S. policy towards the issue of a merger
or consolidation of an airline from an open skies country with
an airline from a "closed" skies country appeared in the short-
lived U.S. proposal to the E.U. open skies countries in Decem-
ber 2002, following the ECJ opinion.12
In that U.S. proposal, which is certainly worth resurrection,
the U.S. implicitly indicated that it would have no problem with
the airlines of two or more open skies countries continuing to
operate under their open skies agreements regardless of the sur-
vivor(s) of any merger or consolidation. But if one of the air-
lines is from a "closed sky" country, there would be a problem,
though not an insurmountable one.
1o See Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 13,173-74.
11 See Adrianne Larsen, Cost, Control Issues Terminate British Airways-KLM Merger
Plans, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 22, 2000, at 11; European Consolidation in Question after
KLM/BA Talks End, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 26, 2000, at 5. See also Suzanne Kapner,
British Airways and KLM End Merger Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at C4.
12 The text of the U.S. proposal was reprinted as an Appendix to Mendelsohn,
supra note 3, at 13,187-89. For a discussion of the ECJ decision, which was issued
on Nov. 5, 2002, see Fennes, supra note 6.
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To use the example of the aborted BA/KLM consolidation,
the U.S. would not have objected to or thwarted the consolida-
tion or merger itself. If only one merged entity had survived, it
would have enjoyed open skies operating between Holland and
the U.S., but closed skies under Bermuda II between the U.K.
and the U.S. If two entities had survived (especially if each re-
tained its respective national identity), there would have been
few if any changes: open skies to or from Holland, but not to or
from the U.K.
I know of no evidence in any way suggesting that the U.S. has
ever opposed foreign carrier consolidation. While the U.S.
might well be reluctant to reduce the 75% U.S. ownership re-
quirement for its own airlines-and the recent U.N. debates
over Iraq surely helped reinforce the thinking of those who be-
lieve that requirement should be strictly enforced-the U.S.
seems to openly welcome mergers and consolidations among
foreign carriers.1 3
In the negotiations leading to the APEC multilateral agree-
ment,'4 the U.S. did not hesitate acknowledging its belief that its
own capital markets provided a sufficient base for it to be able to
maintain the 75% U.S. ownership requirement. That may or
may not continue to be the case, given the economic distress of
U.S. airlines at the moment and their seeming inability to attract
substantial capital from anywhere, U.S. or abroad. But however
that situation resolves itself, there has never been, and hopefully
never will be, any reluctance among U.S. authorities to acknowl-
edge that foreign airlines coming from much smaller countries
face far more difficult problems attracting the levels of capital
needed to operate world-wide airlines.
In short, the U.S. does not really care about nationality re-
quirements for the ownership of foreign carriers and has regu-
13 The 75% U.S. ownership requirement appears in the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2)(15) (2000).
14 The Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air
Transportation (colloquially known as the "APEC Agreement" - as it was negoti-
ated under the auspices of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) was
concluded on Nov. 15, 2000, and signed by the original five Contracting States
(Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and the U.S.) on May 1, 2001. Multilat-
eral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation, Nov.
15, 2000, available at http://www.state.gov/e/r/5/othr12573pf.htm [hereinafter
APEC]. A list of all the countries with which the U.S. has "open skies" agreement
is available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/r/5/othr/22281pf.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2003).
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larly waived them in the past.' 5 Just as the U.S. DOT licensed
the multinationally-owned Cargo Lion years ago, 16 and just as
the U.S. agreed to a multinational ownership clause in the
APEC multilateral, 7 I believe the U.S. would welcome (with, of
course, appropriate security and other exceptions) relaxing, if
not definitively ending, ownership requirements among foreign
airlines.
The fact that E.U. carriers have not become far more multina-
tionally-owned than they are today-especially in the face of the
multinationally-oriented provisions of Article 4 of EU Council
Regulation 2407 /921 8-only suggests that, whether acknowl-
edged by the European Commission or not, entrenched nation-
alism and national chosen instrument policies continue to
dominate European aviation today.
Italian Transport Minister Lunardi recently warned Alitalia
against an alliance with Air France, stating that "all possible ef-
forts should be made" to keep Alitalia as a national flag carrier.' 9
Despite its precarious financial condition, Swiss International re-
portedly continues to resist substantial investment by Luf-
thansa.2 0 To be sure, small amounts of stock may be exchanged,
if only so as to promote the appearance of multinationalism in
aviation. But that is a far cry from the absorption or disappear-
ance of a prized national carrier, even one that is veritably hang-
ing on the financial ropes.
Moreover, even among those European airlines that pride
themselves on a substantial amount of privatized ownership, it is
no secret that their governments continue to hold so-called
"golden shares" which they could always use to prevent a merger
or consolidation not to their liking. A very recent ECJ opinion
has cast some doubt on the validity of these largely undiscussed
15 For an in-depth discussion of the U.S. waiver policy, see Mendelsohn, supra
note 3, at 13,172-73.
16 See Translux International Airlines, supra note 8.
17 See APEC, supra note 14, at art. 3(2).
is Council Regulation 2407/92, on Licensing of Air Carriers, 1992 O.J. (L240)
1. For the full text of this regulation and the others that comprised the so-called
third phase of liberalization that created the unified European aviation market in
1992, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
19 Martial Tardy, Italian Minister Wants Alitalia to Stay Away from Air France, AVIA-
TION DAILY, Aug. 12, 2003, at 2.
20 Lufthansa, Swiss International in Investment Talks, AVIATION DAILY, July 1, 2003,
at 1.
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and undisclosed "golden shares."' 2' But there seems to be no
evidence that the ECJ decision has caused them to disappear
among any of the E.U. Member States, whether their airlines
enjoy lesser or greater degrees of government ownership. It
may well be that European airline managements, especially
within the few airlines that are largely privatized, might welcome
mergers or consolidations that tend to blur or even blot out na-
tional identities. But is this true also of their air ministries
whose raison d'etre over the past five decades has been not only to
nourish and encourage, but even to justify their very existence
as a ministry, on the basis of their national airline?
IV. THE MYTH THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
HAS ARTICULATED AN ACCEPTABLE THEORY
OF RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
European commentators have thus far been almost uniformly
silent about the European Commission's unique approach to
the theory of Right of Establishment as though suggesting that it
comports totally with accepted practice. Again, nothing could
be further from the truth.
To the extent that the Right of Establishment theory emerged
and was accepted in international legal thinking in the past two
decades, it always assumed a company from one country estab-
lishing a largely separate and independent entity in another
country. Thus, Nissan or Honda, though foreign owned and
controlled, became U.S. corporations by incorporating subsidi-
aries in the U.S., abiding by U.S. labor, tax and other laws, and
in all respects operating in the U.S. in much the same manner
and under much the same conditions as General Motors or
Ford.
Similar thinking prevailed at the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its recent efforts to
fashion a draft open skies all-cargo bilateral or multilateral tem-
plate.22 The OECD discussions over the Right of Establishment
21 See Case C-98/01, Comm'n of the European Communities v. United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2003] E.C.R. 00, 2 C.M.L.R. 19; Case
4631000, Comm'n of the European Community v. Kingdom of Spain [2003].
22 Between 1999 and 2002, the OECD undertook extensive work on the subject
of "Regulatory Reform in International Air Cargo Transportation." The results
of these efforts appeared in 2002, when the OECD widely circulated a finalized
draft open skies all-cargo multilateral agreement as well as a substantively compa-
rable template for amending bilateral agreements. See Liberalization of Air Cargo
52720031
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took place in the context of the effort to alter and broaden the
ownership and control clauses traditionally incorporated in bi-
lateral air agreements. In those discussions, the participants
made exactly the same assumption: no matter the nationality of
the majority owner(s) of a particular multinationally-owned air-
line, that airline would incorporate itself in a particular country,
receive its license to conduct air services and its safety oversight
from the authorities of that country, and in all respects operate
in much the same manner and under much the same conditions
as any other airline incorporated in and licensed by that coun-
try. The OECD participants expressly provided that a "con-
tracting party" may be "a group of states" (thus contemplating
designations by the E.U. or the European Commission), but still
assumed some sort of "national" scheme of oversight or
regulation.
This assumption, while totally ignoring ownership, rests on a
fairly healthy amount of "national" input or regulation by the
state (or multinational entity) of incorporation. But how else
could the air operator's certificate (AOC), safety oversight, mini-
mum insurance mandates and all those other requirements that
had made aviation so internationally accepted, while so safe and
reliable, be assured as they had been when the airline was both
regulated by, and substantially owned and controlled by nation-
als of, that country?
What the thinkers and formulators of the OECD ownership
and control articles had set out to do in their draft text was pre-
cisely to preserve the scheme and concept of effective national
regulation, while eliminating the aspect of national ownership.
When the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
later convened a similar group of international experts to focus
on similar issues, their conclusions reflected much the same
traditional scheme of preserving some form of effective, presum-
ably national, regulation. 24 That approach clearly would have
worked and may still work, provided that it is not made irrele-
vant by the recent ECJ decision and its interpretation by the Eu-
ropean Commission.25
Transport, OECD Doc. DSTI/DOT (2002), I/REVI (May 2, 2002) available at
http://www.oecd.org.
23 Id. at Part III, art. 1.
24 See Consolidated Conclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendations and Declarations,
Agenda Item 2.1, ICAO Doc. ATConf/5 (Mar. 31, 2003).
25 See sulna notes 1, 3.
528
MYTHS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
While not experts on the provisions of the Treaty of Rome,
the OECD and ICAO draftsmen, like those in the U.S. who
thought about the Right of Establishment as it could be adopted
and applied in aviation, started from the same premise. This
premise was that the Right of Establishment provision in the
Treaty of Rome (original Article 52), like generally accepted in-
ternational thinking on the subject, expressly allowed compa-
nies from one Community country to establish themselves (or
wholly owned subsidiaries) in other Community countries, in
the words of Article 52, "under the conditions laid down for its
own nationals by the law of the country where such establish-
ment is effected." 6 Thus, if France required Air France to
maintain its main place of business in France, hold a French
AOC, and be subject to French safety oversight and all other
French laws and regulations relating to international aviation, a
Greek or other community airline seeking to "establish" in
France and to operate directly between France and the U.S.
would have to do likewise.
As one of its participants, I can fairly say that no one in the
OECD group that drafted the OECD's proposed O&C clause
had any idea that we would all shortly be confronted with a to-
tally radical departure from the traditional approach to the
Right of Establishment in international aviation. No one could
have thought at that time that a Greek or other community-
owned airline seeking to operate a turn-around service between
Paris and New York, in competition with Air France, United,
American, and other third and fourth freedom carriers, would
not be required to have a French AOC, or be at all subject to
French safety oversight or other French laws and regulations
normally applied to Air France. That was not an approach that
seemed at all consistent with the terms of Article 52 of the
Treaty of Rome. Nor did any of the European Community par-
ticipants in the OECD deliberations, despite repeated opportu-
nities to do so, ever suggest otherwise.
Yet, within only a short time following the ECJ's decision, the
European Commission let it be known that, whether required
under the terms of the ECJ's decision or not, the Commission's
accepted interpretation of the ECJ's decision was precisely that:
for all practical purposes, the only thing a Community carrier
26 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 52. This treaty was later amended by the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, (1997] O.J. (C340) 3. Also, Article 52 is now Article 49.
2003] 529
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would apparently need in order to be able to operate a turn-
around (also known as seventh freedom) service between Paris
and New York is a third floor, part-time staffed, walk-up ticket
office, say, on Rue Jacob with little or nothing more by way of
oversight or other regulation by the French Government. 2
Moreover, given this purported "mandate" by the ECJ, so the
Commission reasoned, it was necessarily incumbent on the U.S.
and all other non-Community countries to adjust their policies
and practices accordingly. 28 What were formally deemed to be
seventh freedom rights (i.e., Paris - New York) by a carrier such
as Olympic (or, after May 2004, a carrier from Poland or Malta),
were, henceforth, under new Right of Establishment thinking
within the Commission, to become third and fourth freedom
rights as part of the grand effort to unify European aviation and
presumably to jump start the long-delayed movement towards
the consolidation of European airlines.
There is no one, on either side of the ocean, who wishes to
impede European Community progress towards unification.
Whether advance notice of this quite remarkable interpretation
of Right of Establishment would have been helpful is beside the
point. Likewise, whether the mere third floor Olympic or Air
Malta ticket office on Rue Jacob will be sufficient for the Euro-
pean Commission or, for that matter, the Government of France
(not to mention officials of Air France), remains to be seen.
No one on the European side of the ocean has yet articulated
how far the Right of Establishment interpretation will be car-
ried. Nor, for that matter, has there been any public discussion
among any of the industry participants in this fascinating global
enigma as to its ramifications or consequences. Surely, it need
not go as far as the Rue Jacob example. If the past is any guide
to the future, moreover, the French Government and Air France
will almost certainly argue that much more should be required
in the interests of assuring proper and continued regulatory and
safety oversight in international aviation.
On the other hand, it is not all that difficult for those involved
in international aviation to envision the emergence someday of
a central European authority, of which the already existing Eu-
ropean Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is but one healthy exam-
27 See Mendelsohn, supra note 3 (quoting Letter from Francois Lemoureux);
Fennes, supra note 7.
28 Id.
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pie,29 that will either supervise national authorities or will be
responsible for issuing AOCs and crew licenses, for assuring air-
worthiness, for providing safety oversight, for the task of
designating airlines, and for carrying out the myriad of obliga-
tions and responsibilities that are being administered in interna-
tional aviation today by national authorities. That is some
distance down the road, however, and the questions of what will
happen next in European aviation seem to be upon us today.
For example, has Olympic already advised the French Govern-
ment and Air France that its Paris ticket office, whether on Rue
Jacob or elsewhere, entitles it to operate Paris - New York, as it
now intends? Or has it decided that its existing ticket office in
London, or one it intends to open there shortly, entitles it to
operate-of course, with readily available slots promptly pro-
vided by the U.K. Government or British Airways-what are now
deemed (for all Community Member State carriers) to be third
and fourth freedom services between Heathrow and JFK?
The even more pressing question is what can or should be
accomplished in the upcoming U.S.-E.U. negotiations that
started in early October and are scheduled to continue in the
months ahead. Well before any Commission proposal is even
placed on a negotiating table, it would seem that the E.U. must
do some very serious thinking and provide some definitive an-
swers to these questions. For example, were the U.S. willing to
accept this once seventh, now third, freedom service from both
Paris and London, who will designate the Greek or Maltese air-
line operating the turn-around services from these cities? Who
will provide the necessary oversight to assure proper safety? And
whose tax and other laws will apply? Indeed, will the U.K. avia-
tion authority sit by supinely and simply agree when these air-
lines invoke the Commission's interpretation of Right of
Establishment and demand to operate these newly created third
freedom services from London? Or will the European Commis-
sion be forced, as before," to bring another prolonged lawsuit
against these non-compliant governments before anything can
be done? It is not surprising that when European airline and
government officials have been informally asked about how far
Right of Establishment can, should, or must be extended, the
9 The EASA was scheduled to begin operations in September 2003. For de-
tailed information, see http://europa.eu.int/agencies/easa/index-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2003).
30 See Fennes, supra note 7. The decision of the European Court of Justice
involved seven EU Member States and the U.K
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interesting answer has been-as far as possible in the upcoming
negotiations with the U.S.
V. MINI-MYTHS IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
One could go on interminably with other myths that circulate
throughout the international aviation community but to do so
would suggest that myths outweigh reality. It would not be fair,
however, if I did not allude to at least three other mini-myths, all
relating directly to the United States, that seem to enjoy a place
in current thinking: (a) that the U.S. would be making a step
forward if it adopted the E.U. approach and allowed foreigners
to own up to 49% of a U.S. airline; (b) that the U.S. Department
of Defense can logically oppose a Right of Establishment law in
the U.S. that allowed foreigners to own 100% of a U.S. airline
on national security grounds; and (c) that the U.S. Government
is implacably opposed to allowing foreign airlines to wet lease
their aircraft to U.S. operators. The following briefly addresses
each mini-myth:
(a) The majority E.U. ownership requirement (or 49% limit
on foreign ownership) that appears in Article 4(2) of E.U.
Council Regulation 2407/9231 is a sham, and is not persuasive
precedent for the U.S. to move forward with identical numbers.
Unless a foreign investor can exercise control over an airline, he
or she is not very likely to invest up to 49% or any other signifi-
cant percent. Moreover, both Article 4(2) and its U.S. policy
counterpart provide that "effective control" must remain in lo-
cal (i.e., national or E.U. Member State) hands, which means
that to the extent that a 49% ownership interest might or could
amount to "effective control" (which would surely be the case
with any widely traded public company), an inquiry would need
to be undertaken to determine if it violated the limitation. All
of this is enormously wasteful and time consuming, and done
for no particular reason. The U.S. and the E.U. should consider
adopting either an open traditional Right of Establishment ap-
proach, allowing full ownership and control by foreigners, or
simply toss in the towel on the issue until both sides have mai-
tured to the point where that is possible.
(b) The U.S. Department of Defense is in no position to op-
pose in aviation almost precisely the same system as currently
31 See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 18, at art. 4(2).
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exists in maritime, namely, total (i.e., 100%) foreign ownership
of almost every U.S. flag vessel that the DOT relies on in the
event of activation of the maritime counterpart program (VISA)
to the CRAF program in aviation. 2 Indeed, the Department of
Defense has never voiced even the slightest complaint or appre-
hension about the reliability of the foreign owners of these U.S.
flag vessels in the event of a call-up.
To be sure, the U.S. flag but foreign-owned vessels are all
crewed by U.S. seamen. But, were the U.S. to adopt a traditional
Right of Establishment approach in aviation, the foreign com-
pany owning the U.S. flag airline would be incorporated in the
U.S. and working under the same labor, tax and other laws as all
U.S. owned, U.S. flag carriers. Moreover, U.S. flag but foreign-
owned carriers would be on notice that to participate in Fly
America and other allegedly preferential federal programs
would require participation in CRAF.
European aviation spokesmen have frequently criticized the
U.S. policy of not allowing their carriers to participate or com-
pete in what they believe to be the discriminatory and financially
preferential Fly America and City Pairs programs.33 This seems
to be still another myth, as two recent developments have
worked to reduce, if not eliminate, most or perhaps even all of
the alleged financial advantages of these programs. First, the
extensive code share arrangements between foreign and U.S.
carriers have opened the Fly America program for every foreign
carrier code share participant by allowing that foreign carrier
participant to enjoy the benefits of the program. Second, the
administrators of the City Pairs program have been so successful
in negotiating low fares that most informed observers now seem
to agree that the current fares are hardly advantageous or even
financially attractive.
In any event, by joining CRAF, a foreign-owned U.S. flag car-
rier would be automatically able to participate in both pro-
grams. And if that is insufficient incentive for the foreign
32 CRAF is an acronym for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, which is authorized
under 49 U.S.C. § 41106 (2000). VISA is an acronym for the Voluntary In-
termodal Sealift Agreement, which appears to be authorized under 50 U.S.C.
§ 2158 (2000).
13 Under the Fly America program, U.S. government employees on official
travel are required to use U.S. air carriers when reasonably available 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 340118 (1998). Under the City Pairs program, the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) negotiates city pair fares with U.S. airlines for use by U.S. govern-
ment employees.
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owners to join CRAF, nothing would preclude the DOT from
notifying these carriers, when issuing their U.S. carrier operat-
ing authority, that were they ever to fail to participate fully in a
CRAF call-up, they would risk the continuing validity of their
DOT operating authority. The incentive for continuing active
participation in CRAF could hardly be more persuasive. Like-
wise, the national security concerns that have always discouraged
a Right of Establishment approach in U.S. aviation policy should
be largely, if not totally, dissipated.
(c) As was thoroughly discussed when the OECD debated
and adopted its very forward-looking draft article on wet leas-
ing, 4 it ill behooves the U.S. to oppose wet leasing-in by U.S.
carriers (at least in certain circumstances) when U.S. carriers
are so actively involved in wet leasing-out their aircraft to foreign
carriers. Wet leasing is a phenomenon that is here to stay; it is a
simple and not excessively expensive method for airlines to be
able to test a marketplace, or to serve an existing but tempora-
rily burgeoning marketplace, without purchasing new equip-
ment to do so. Opposition within the U.S. Government to wet
leasing-in by U.S. carriers should be on the wane except, of
course, for foreign crewed aircraft that might be wet leased-in by
a U.S. carrier to operate cabotage routes in the U.S. Wet leasing-
in to operate third and forth freedom flights to and from the
U.S. may well raise eyebrows, but would clearly seem susceptible
to resolution by the parties involved in the transaction. Wet
leasing-in to provide services abroad should raise no problems at
all. Nor should there be issues of adequate safety oversight for
any foreign carriers from countries enjoying Category 1 status
with the FAA. 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The international aviation community has now heard so
much hype and hoopla about the TCAA, 36 open access, and free
34 See supra note 22.
35 For a list of the countries the FAA has assessed under its International Avia-
tion Safety Assessment Program ([ASA), see The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, International Aviation Safety Assessment, available at www2.faa.gov/avr/
iasa/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
36 TCAA is an acronym for Transatlantic Common Aviation Area. It is not a
template of any type of agreement and appears merely to be an E.U. wish list of
European aviation goals. See Towards a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area:
AEA Policy Statement, Association of European Airlines (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports/aeapolicystatement.pdf.
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trade in aviation that it is hard to imagine anything emerging
from the upcoming E.U.-U.S. negotiations that would meet ad-
vance billing. The latest buzz-word of an "early harvest" may
suggest that far less weighty subjects than most of those dis-
cussed in this article might be on the opening agenda and
might well be susceptible to some useful, even if modest,
resolution.
The panoply of problems facing the E.U., however, is far
more daunting than those it faces when it negotiates with the
U.S. Even if the U.S. were to agree with the E.U. on an owner-
ship and control provision that allows multinational E.U. Mem-
ber State ownership of E.U. carriers or that even contemplates
some "seventh" freedom flexibility, the E.U. is still required to
negotiate comparable provisions with the rest of the world. Nor
does an agreement with the U.S. necessarily signal agreement by
any, let alone most, third countries. In short, for the E.U., an
agreement with the U.S. on an O&C clause and its impact is
merely the first step in a lengthy process.
Perhaps the better or more prudent approach would be for
the larger aviation community, perhaps through the OECD or
ICAO, to think in terms of drafting an agreement that is multi-
laterally rather than bilaterally oriented. Countries could then,
if and when they decide to do so, simply sign on to an agree-
ment that has an acceptable O&C clause, allowing for recogni-
tion of multinational ownership, whether by E.U. Member State
airlines or by airlines from other multi-state groupings that may
emerge in the future.
A country like the U.S., for example, could sign onto Protocol
1, which accepts multinational airline designations by and from
other countries, while reserving for the time being on signing
onto Protocol 2, which would terminate restrictions on national
ownership (i.e., adopt the Right of Establishment approach and
allow foreign ownership of nationally flagged carriers). A simi-
lar multilateral effort might work equally well for an approach
that allows seventh freedom flights by Member State airlines so
long as there are appropriate guarantees of effective national or
multinational regulatory oversight.
The originality and inventiveness of legal thinking in the in-
ternational aviation law community borders on the boundless
when the intent or need is properly defined. That means, how-
ever, that even the most cherished of myths, and especially those
discussed in the preceding pages, must first be debunked.
20031 535
i~LAS.lt*
